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Roots, Trunk, and Branches Of Modern Environmental Law:
A Book Review Comparison of
AN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY'
and
FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY2
Robert F. Blomquist3
INTRODUCTION
As a beginning we should try to clarify our
thinking by looking, in some historical depth, at the
presuppositions that underlie modem technology and
science. Science was traditionally aristocratic,
speculative, intellectual in intent; technology was
lower-class, empirical, action-oriented. The quite
sudden fusion of these two, towards the middle of the
19th century, is surely related to the slightly prior and
contemporary democratic revolutions which, by
reducing social barriers, tended to assert a functional
unity of brain and hand. Our ecologic[al] crisis is the
product of an emerging, entirely novel, democratic
culture. The issue is whether a democratized world
Edited with comments by Robert L. Fischman, Maxine I. Lipeles & Mark
S. Squillace. Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Co. 1996. 529 pp.
2 Edited with comments by Richard L. Revesz. New York: Oxford
University Press. 1997. 334 pp.
3 Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; B.S. 1973
(Economics), University of Pennsylvania (Wharton School); J.D. 1977, Cornell
Law School. I express thanks to Gini Bums for providing me with the French
mentioned in the Essay.
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can survive its own implications. Presumably we
cannot, unless we rethink our axioms.4
Life-biomass... is stored information; living
matter is stored information in the cells and in the
genes. [T]here is more information of a higher order
of sophistication and complexity stored in a few
square yards of forest than there is in all the libraries
of mankind. Obviously, that is a different order of
information. It is the information of the universe we
live in. It is the information that has been flowing for
millions of years. In this total information context,
man may not be necessarily the highest or most
interesting product.5
In FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
[hereinafter "Foundations"],6 Professor Richard L. Revesz is
concerned with "introduc[ing] students to the major theoretical
approaches in the field of environmental law and policy."7 Similarly,
in AN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY [hereinafter "Anthology"],
Professors Robert L. Fischman, Maxine I. Lipeles, and Mark S.
Squillace are intent on exposing students to basic "central and
recurring themes that cut across ... statutory, regulatory, and judicial
debates" by focusing "on the [big] ideas that weave together the
fragmented authorities of [modem] environmental law."' Essentially,
4 AN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY (Robert L. Fischman, Maxine I.
Lipeles & Mark S. Squillace eds., 1996). 3 [hereinafter "Anthology'] (excerpt
from Lynn White, Jr. The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis, 155 Scd. 1203
(1967)).
5 GARY SNYDER, TURTLE ISLAND 107-08 (1974) (from essay, The
Wilderness).
6 FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (Richard L. Revesz
ed. 1997) [hereinafter "Foundations"].
7 Id. at v.
s ANTHOLOGY, supra note 1, at xi.
ANTHOLOGY COMPARISON
both books seek to pose what may be thought of as environmental
law's meta-questions at lafin de deuxi me millinaire (the end of the
millennium) or, to employ the biological tree metaphor that I will
pursue in this Essay,9 both books address the roots, trunk and
branches of the subject.
Foundations and Anthology will be welcome additions to the
reading lists of law school courses on basic environmental law, while
serving as useful additions to the professional libraries of law
professors, members of the bar, and law students. The overarching
reason for the success of both books is the skill and sagacity of the
editors in forming transparent paradigms for understanding what I
have referred to elsewhere as "the beauty of complexity" of modem
environmental law.'0
9 See infra. notes 9 to 49 and accompanying text.
10 See generally, Robert F. Blomquist, The Beauty of Complexity (Book
Review Essay), 39 HASTINGS L.J. 555 (1988).
T. S. Eliot noted that: "As we grow older, the world becomes
stranger, its pattern more complicated.". Such is the lot of
environmental law: As it has grown older it has become
stranger, its patterns more complicated. Indeed, the idea of
complexity is essential to understanding the meaning and
operation of environmental law and policy.
Id.. at 566 (footnote omitted).
As [a] Professor Kasdanoff has explained in discussing
complexity and chaos in the physical sciences, "[c]haotic
patterns are characteristically quite varied in their details, but
they may have quite regular general features." For example,
while photographs of "the intricate pattern of atmospheric
swirling or turbulence" on the surfaces of the planets Jupiter and
Earth take on fantastic - and ostensibly random forms, upon
closer examination, the patterns reveal "underlying regularity
and order." So too, the apparently chaotic patterns of a dried up
lake bed or frost on a window, when properly viewed, are
orderly and regular. Kasdanoff elaborates this thesis by
describing a "geometry of chaos." In short, multiple principles
and elements can be characterized by "both impressive
simplicity and imposing complexity."
Accordingly, even when many principles or elements
5051998]
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This Essay is divided into three parts. First, in Part I, I
examine the basic dimensions, institutions, and concepts which form
the "roots" of modem environmental law, as discerned by the editors
of Foundations and Anthology. Second, Part II of this Essay explores
what I call the "trunk" of the subject: the principles of risk
assessment and risk management contained in the two environmental
law books under review. Finally, the Essay compares and contrasts
the complex and proliferating "branches" of modem environmental
law as reflected in Foundations and Anthology.
I. ROOTS
For the editors of Foundations and Anthology, the roots of
late-20th century environmental law run deep. Indeed, both books
present a rich assortment of economic readings which appear to be
the taproot of the subject; economics is the source of essential
theoretical ideas pertaining to how best to achieve environmental
goals and constitutes "a powerful tool for assessing the costs and
benefits of a given legal rule or case outcome."" In Foundations, for
instance, Professor Revesz addresses what he terms the "normative,
positive and attitudinal characteristics" of "the economic perspective
on environmental degradation." 2 Accordingly, key readings in
Foundations question the "socially optimal amount of pollution" in
society in order to "maximize the social welfare," 3 ask what is the
co-exist, simplicity and unity may exist if a pattern or patterns
can be discerned to make order out of chaos. This discovery of
discernable patterns is what makes complexity beautiful. Out of
swirling confusion comes due proportion. From dissonance and
darkness come harmony and brightness. What was obscure
shines with clarity.
Id. at 570-71 (footnote omitted).
I I BAILY KUKIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW 29
(1994).
12 FOUNDATIONS, supra note 3, at 3.
13 Id.
ANTHOLOGY COMPARISON
nature of the positive, or descriptive characteristics of "excessive
pollution" by "reference to a divergence between the polluter's private
costs and the social costs imposed by the activity," 4 and inquire
about how society should view a polluter -- as a social actor who
engages in anti-social behavior or as an individual who rationally
seeks to further her self interest.15 Revesz does a good job in
distilling the differences in theorists' "prescription for the design for
social mechanisms to control the undesirable [economic] aspects of
environmental degradation;" 6 it boils down, in Professor Revesz's
view to "varying degrees of faith in the beneficial effects of
governmental action.
17
In Anthology, by way of comparison, Fischman, Lipeles, and
Squillace address the "new urgency" of economic perspectives on
environmental law in light of the concerted recent efforts by
"government decision-makers... to find more efficient and effective
ways of addressing environmental problems."'8 Thus, major readings
in Anthology question whether the earth should be conceptualized as
a "spaceship" involving a "closed system which destroys its assets
only at its future peril;"'9 whether government "administrative
agencies should be allowed to adopt only those rules where the
benefits exceed the costs and where no more cost-effective
alternatives are available;"2" whether economic-efficiency -- despite
14 Id.
15 Id. The two excerpts from FOUNDATIONS, which explore the economic
perspective on environmental degradation, include Garrett Hardin's, The Tragedy
of the Commons, and Ronald H. Coase's, The Problem of Social Cost.
16 Id. at 4.
17 Id.
18 ANTHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 197.
19 Id.; see also id. at 197-204 (excerpting Kenneth E. Boulding's The
Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth) and id. at 204-211 (excerpting Robert
Repetto's Wasting Assets: The Need For National Resource Accounting).
20 Id. at 214; see also id. at 214-224 (excerpting Arthur P. Hurter Jr.'s,
George S. Tolley's and Robert G. Fabian's BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS AND THE
COMMON SENSE OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY).
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its allure as a policy sorter -- should always be our only or
predominant, social goal;2 and, whether flexible, market-based
economic incentives for environmental protection are preferable to
uniform, governmentally-established and administered "command
and control" environmental regulations.22 The editors of Anthology
do a superb job in posing discussion questions and notes on
environmental law and economics; this supplemental commentary
provides an excellent summary of recent law and economics
literature.
Lateral roots of modem environmental law are intertwined
and connected up to the economics taproot of both books under
review.23 In Anthology these subsidiary roots entail ethical
dimensions (containing texts from a variety of sources which discuss
such topics as whether natural objects should have standing to sue for
environmental infractions and the claims of future generations on the
biosphere);24 legal institutions (containing law review extracts under
three institutional headings: Congress, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), and the Courts);25 and the environment as property
(addressing four property-related issues: the paradigm of the
commons, privatization, the public trust doctrine and takings).26 In
Foundations, these subsidiary roots entail noneconomic perspectives
on environmental degradation (containing excerpts from two law
21 Id. at 224; see also id at 224-232 (excerpting Mark Sagoffs Economic
Theory and EnvironmentalLaw) and id at 232-23 8 (excerpting Stephen Kellman's
Cost-Benefit Analysis and Ethical Critique).
22 See id. at 238-249 (excerpting Robert N. Stavin's and Bradley W.
Whitehead's article Dealing With Pollution: Market-based Incentives For
Environmental Protection); see also id. at 249-266 (excerpting Howard Latin's
article Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform
Standards and "Fine-tuning" Regulatory Reforms) and id at 266-278 (excerpting
Bruce A. Ackerman's and Richard B. Stewart's article Reforming Environmental
Law).
23 See infra note 21 to 26 and accompanying text.
24 See ANTHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 1-64.
25 See id. at 65-196.
26 See id. at 279-387.
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review articles with a philosophical bent),27 distributional
consequences ofenvironmentalpolicy (including various readings on
"environmental racism" and "locally undesirable land uses" -- or
LULUs),28 and the choice of regulatory tools (presenting an
assortment of readings on "traditional command and control"
regulation, on the one hand, and alternative approaches of legally
ordering the environment such as incentives, like deposit-refunds,
liability for harm, and informational approaches to regulation).29
Both books present convincing sets of readings and astute
supplementary commentaries which demonstrate why foundational
non-economic perspectives on modem environmental law and policy
are essential for proper understanding. Essentially, while both books
argue in favor of the centrality of the economic perspective --
involving such basic elements as efficiency, marginal costs,
economies of scale, public goods, and free riders -- they also
acknowledge the big void in microeconomic analysis of costs and
benefits implicit in environmental law and economics discourse:
economics is not really value-free and usually overlooks basic
Kantian issues of right and wrong, while overemphasizing, at times,
those factors that are more easily translated into dollars and cents.
Accordingly, both books agree that the root non-economic
perspective involves ethical theory and the law. Armed with such a
perspective, the good environmental lawyer is able to understand
varying normative precepts-standards of "right" and "wrong" human
behavior toward the environment that maximizes goodness and
justice.
27 See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 3, at 18-44.
28 See id at 102-129.
29 See id. at 130-158.
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II. TRUNK
Rooted in essential economic and non-economic perspectives
on environmental law,3" risk assessment and risk management are
depicted in Anthology and Foundations as the pillar of modem
environmental law -- holding up and providing support for more
specialized policy-focused and media-focused offshoots of the
subject. In Foundations, Professor Revesz emphasizes, however, in
anthologizing an article by former EPA Commissioner William
Ruckleshaus,3" "that a sharp [theoretical] distinction should be drawn
between risk assessment and risk management."32 Thus, "[r]isk
assessment is the first step in the [environmental] regulatory process.
Once a regulatory agency has made ajudgment about the nature and
extent of a risk, it must decide whether and how much the risk should
be regulated -- a process known as risk management [of human
health]."33 While certain thinkers like Ruckleshaus may, however,
see a simple black and white distinction between risk assessment, on
the one hand, and risk management, on the other hand,34 other
30 See id. at 102-129.
31 See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 3, at 48-52 (excerpting William D.
Ruckleshaus' article Risk Signs and Democracy).
32 See id. at 45 (emphasis added).
33 Id.
34 As explained by Professor Revesz in prefatory commentary, Ruckleshaus:
advocates keeping political considerations out of the risk
assessment process -- an approach that many believe EPA had
not followed under [other administration's]. According to
Ruckleshaus, the appropriate place for political decisions is at
the risk management stage.
Ruckleshaus recognizes that risk assessment is
dependent on a variety of assumptions and that these
assumptions will reflect the values of the individuals responsible
for the choice; whether they are scientists, civil servants, or
politicians. He argues that the discretion of individual risk
assessors should be constrained through generic policies
governing recurring issues. Such policies were adopted in the
ANTHOLOGY COMPARISON
commentators anthologized by Revesz perceive a more complex
process of dealing with environmental risk. For example, in a Revesz
redacted version of an article in Foundations, entitled In Search of
Safety: Chemicals and Cancer Risk, the authors argue that
"quantitative risk assessments have not proven to be the panacea that
they were intended to be" because."[a]gency risk estimates convey
both too much and too little confidence in science. The estimates
convey overconfidence in a sense that the true extent of biological
uncertainty and scientific conflict is not reflected in the published
numbers. At the same time, the procedures used by agency analysts
often do not incorporate all of the relevant biological information and
the final numbers often fly in the face of technical intuition and
judgment."35 This state of affairs exists, according to the authors,
because of "pressure to do so for policy reasons;" yet, they observe
that we do not live in a simple world -- rather, "the processes by
which chemical exposures produce cancer vary widely."36 Similarly,
in another Revesz redaction included in Foundations, United States
Justice Stephen Breyer expresses concern about the disparity between
early 1980's by EPA and a number of other federal agencies.
One prescribes no-threshold model for carcinogens, for example,
so that any exposure to a carcinogen is assumed to increase the
probability of cancer. Ruckleshaus argues that such policies
make the process of risk assessment more uniform and less likely
to be influenced by political considerations.
Id. Another article excerpted by Revesz, for example, seems to agree with the
black and white distinction advocated by Ruckleshaus. See id. at 52-58
(anthologizing an article by Alon Rosenthal, George M. Gray, and John D.
Graham, Legislating Acceptable Cancer Risk From Exposure to Toxic Chemicals)
(explaining how risk assessment of a carcinogen takes place in four methodological
steps before risk management occurs. These steps are (1) hazard identification, (2)
dose response evaluation, (3) exposure assessment and (4) risk characterization.)
3s Id. at 58 (excerpting John D. Graham, Laura C. Green, and Marc J.
Roberts, In Search of Safety: Chemicals and Cancer Risk).
36 Id. at 59 (same excerpt). Thus, "[b]enzene does not act like a
formaldehyde; leukemia is not like squamous cell nasal carcinoma. There are often
significant differences in particular compounds affect different species." Id.
1998]
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how experts assess risk and how members of the lay public assess
risk.37 Moreover, as explained by Revesz, Justice Breyer is skeptical
about proposals for "more effective communication about risk" to
"change the cognitive processes that lead to the gap between scientific
and lay perceptions about risk."3
Foundations also includes various materials on the specifics
of risk management. Anthologized extracts address the following
topics: the process by which particular risks are deemed "[socially]
acceptable" and the undesirability of "simplistic solutions" to
environmental risk management -- such as a "no-risk" standard -- if
competing alternatives present "only slightly greater risk but [are] far
less costly;"39 the numerous "competing frameworks for making
37 See id at 65-70 (excerpting chapter from Stephen Breyer, BREAKING THE
VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993)).
38 Id. at 47.
39 Id. at 76 (summarizing excerpt from Baruch Fischhoff's et al.,
ACCEPTABLE RISK (1981)).
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regulatory decisions" about the environment4" and a philosophical and
technical criticism of cost-benefit analysis.41
Anthology includes redactions which somewhat overlap with
the sources on risk assessment and risk management in
Foundations,42 in addition to other extracts not contained in
40 Id at 76 (summarizing excerpt from Lester B. Lave's article, The Strategy
of Social Regulation: Decision Frameworks for Policy at FOUNDATIONS 84-92).
Professor Revesz summarizes Lave's Frameworks as follows:
1. Market regulation, under which individuals choose,
through market transactions, the risk that they wish to
be exposed to;
2. no-risk under which activities posing any risk at all
are banned;
3. technology-based standards, under which regulation
is set by reference to what can be achieved through
the use of the best available control technology;
4. risk-risk (direct), under which risks to consumers of
a product eliminated by regulations are balanced
against the risks to these consumers that would
increase as a result of this regulation;
5. risk-risk (indirect), under which the risk to individuals
other than the consumer of the product would also be
taken into account;
6. risk-benefit, under which both the benefits and
burdens of a regulations would be taken into account;
7. costs-effectiveness, under which regulation would
seek to achieve a given goal at least cost;
8. regulatory budget, under which regulation could not
impose on affected parties costs that exceeded a
predetermined figure;
9. benefit-cost (sometimes termed cost-benefit) under
which the benefits and costs of regulation would be
quantified and compared.
Id. at 76-77.
41 See id at 77 (referencing excerpt of Steven Kelman's article, Cost-benefit
Analysis: An Ethical Critique in FOUNDATIONS at 93-98).
42 See, e.g., ANTHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 391-406 (excerpts of Alon
Rosenthal et. al., Legislating Acceptable Cancer Risks From Exposure to Toxic
Chemicals) (substantial overlap with FOUNDATIONS); id. at 440-446 (excerpts from
5131998]
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Foundations.43 Both books ask the overarching question of what are
the logic and limits of risk assessment and risk management in a free
society. In editing their anthologized materials and in their
supplemental explanations and questions for further inquiry, the
editors of Foundations and Anthology answer the aforementioned
overarching question by presenting fascinating and informative texts
which depict the sophistication and usefulness of extant risk
assessment and risk management theory but also show considerable
theory and praxis.
HI. BRANCHES
To complete the biological metaphor sketched at the outset of
this Essay, the crowning touch of Foundations and Anthology is the
portrayal of what many thought of as a miscellany of interesting
branches of modem environmental law and policy. These branches
are necessarily derived from the basic conceptual antecedents and
architectonic structure of the subject," analogized in Parts I and II,
respectively of this Essay as the Roots45 and Trunk46 of environmental
law and policy. For the editors of Anthology, who focused their book
on the fundamental characteristics of environmental law and policy,
the subject of international law and policy, and the branches of
transboundary and global environmental issues and environmental
Stephen Breyer's book, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARDS EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION (1993)) (different excerpts than FOUNDATIONS). Cf id. at 413-
419 (excerpts from a different article by William D. Ruckleshaus, Risk In a Free
Society, than contained in FOUNDATIONS, supra note 28).
43 See, e.g., id. at 423-427 (excerpts from John Atcheson's article, The
Department of Risk Reduction or Risky Business); id. at 429-437 (excerpts from
Peter Huber's article, Safety and Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts); id at 451-464 (excerpts from Clayton P. Gillette's and
James E. Krier's article, Risk Courts, andAgencies).
44 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
45 See supra notes 9-26 and accompanying text.
46 See supra notes 27-40 and accompanying text.
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regulation's interface with international trade are presented through
excerpts from three articles47 and several interesting notes.48 In
Foundations, however, where the scope of the work is broader, but
less deep than Anthology, a variety of branches proliferate: in addition
to transboundary and global environmental issues and environmental
regulation's mesh with international trade,49 Foundations presents
materials which deal with the political dimensions of environmental
law (i.e., federalism and environmental regulation; environmental law
and public choice theory),5" and two media-specific case studies on
47 See ANTHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 468-483 (excerpting Edith Brown
Weiss' article, International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the
Emergence of a New World Order); id. at 487-500 (excerpting Thomas J.
Schoenbaum's article, Free International Trade and Protection of the Environment
Irreconcilable Conflict?); id at 503-514 (excerpting David A. Wirth's article, A
Matchmaker's Challenge: Marrying International Law and American
Environmental Law).
48 See id at 467 (pointing out, among other things, that "[t]he complexity of
the policy and technical issues that characterize the domestic environmental scene
pale in comparison with the challenges facing international environmental
lawmaking. In addition to the myriad of domestic concerns -- including scientific
uncertainty, tension between economic and environmental interests, and differing
institutional perspectives - international lawmaking also raises sensitive issues of
international sovereignty, enforceability, and diplomacy that substantially
complicate the task of identifying and attempting to resolve environmental
problems of international and global scope"); id. at 483-487 (outlining, among
other things, the importance of the United Nation's Conference on the Human
Environment, held in Stockholm, Sweden in 1972, and the 1992 United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (U.N.C.E.D. held in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil); id at 500-503 (questioning, among other things, the potential for harmony
between the promotion of trade and the protection of the environment); id at 514-
515 (questioning whether the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is
constitutional).
49 See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 3, at 379-406 (notes and excerpts on
environmental regulation and international trade) and at 307-334 (notes and
excerpts on international environmental law).
so See id at 161-182 (notes and materials on federalism and environmental
regulation); id at 183-220 (notes and materials on environmental law and public
choice theory).
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control of air pollution5 and liability for the cleanup of hazardous
waste sites.
5 2
The editors of both of the books subject to this Essay maintain
standards of excellence in addressing these particularistic aspects of
environmental law and policy. Abundant cross references in both
anthologies to other scholarly literature and legal materials will be
helpful to students seeking more information about these specialized
areas of the subject..
CONCLUSION
In sum, both Foundations and Anthology are useful and user-
friendly texts for their intended audiences. Each book provides a
balanced perspective of disputed issues by inclusion of materials with
different points of view. The organization and structure of each
books is praiseworthy and resembles a beautiful tree with roots,
trunk, and lush branches.
51 See id at 223-246 (notes and materials on control of air pollution).
52 See id. at 347-275 (notes and materials on liability for the cleanup of
hazardous waste sites).
